Oct. 27, 2026 — A Milwaukee County sheriff’s deputy whose distracted driving resulted in a fatal accident has qualified immunity, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided in Estate of Ceaser Stinson v. Joel Streicher, No. 22-3043 (Oct. 14, 2026).
It’s the first case to decide whether inattentive driving could violate substantive due process under County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
“Officer Streicher’s distractedness — regardless of the source — was negligent, perhaps even grossly negligent; it was not obviously unconstitutional,” wrote Judge Diane Sykes on a panel that included Judge Kenneth F. Ripple and Judge Amy J. St. Eve.
The decision reverses Judge J.P. Stadtmueller of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
Red-Light Collision
In his shift’s first hour on Jan. 25, 2020, Streicher stopped at the Milwaukee County Safety Building. On a dating application, he “exchanged a series of sexually explicit messages with a woman he had met.” His last response was at 10:52 a.m.
Jay D. Jerde, Mitchell Hamline 2006, is a legal writer for the State Bar of Wisconsin, Madison. He can be reached by email or by phone at (608) 250-6126.
He drove his unmarked Chevrolet Tahoe north on North 10th Street approaching West State Street at the speed limit.
He looked down either at his phone, which he had unlocked, or on the dashboard screen.
The light at the intersection turned red. It had been red for about 11 seconds when his vehicle entered the intersection and struck Stinson’s car at 11:11 a.m. Stinson died there.
Streicher doesn’t remember seeing Stinson’s car enter the intersection.
It was not Streicher’s first on-duty auto accident. In July 2018, “he drove straight through a controlled intersection from a left-turn-only lane, colliding with the vehicle” next to him that had the right of way.
Streicher resigned after the fatal accident. He pleaded guilty to one count of homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle.
Stinson’s wife and his estate sued Streicher, Milwaukee County, and the county’s insurer under a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 violation of the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause, among other state-law claims. Defendants removed the case to federal court.
Defendants sought summary judgment on the section 1983 claim. They argued that the evidence failed to “shock the conscience” as required under Lewis.
Streicher also argued for qualified immunity because “it was not clearly established at the time of the accident that distracted driving constitutes a due-process violation.”
Judge Stadtmueller denied the motion. He ruled “that a jury should decide whether Streicher’s degree of inattention amounted to a violation of Stinson’s right of due process.” The jury “could assess his credibility and any competing inferences.”
The reason for inattention was immaterial, and Streicher’s past misconduct was irrelevant, Judge Stadtmueller decided.
The jury would resolve the constitutional question before the court would address qualified immunity.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity applies to officers for section 1983 claims “unless their conduct violates clearly established law,” such as a federal statutory or constitutional right, or “the unlawfulness of [his] conduct was clearly established at the time.”
A “clearly established” right is one “that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” The right is specific. The question is beyond debate.
“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense,” Lewis explains.
“Only intentionally inflicted harm, or harm caused by a public official’s deliberate indifference to impending harm, rises to the level of a potential due-process violation.”
Lewis decided a section 1983 claim from a police chase that reached 100 mph with a fleeing motorcycle. A crash killed the suspect’s 16-year-old passenger.
The Lewis court denied the claim. “[O]nly a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking the conscience.”
Comparing Cases
Because “no case has addressed inattentive driving,” the reviewing court compared Streicher’s conduct with officer actions in other section 1983 claims decided by the Seventh Circuit.
When “an on-duty police officer … ran a red light and crashed into another car, killing the driver” in Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, the officer was speeding without headlights, emergency lights, or siren, but he wasn’t going to an emergency.
It wasn’t enough because “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant had actual knowledge of impending harm [that] he consciously refused to prevent.”
The claim in Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, arose from an officer placing spikes in the path of a fleeing car. The suspect’s car “hit the spikes and careened into another vehicle, killing the driver and her son.”
The actions didn’t involve “a purpose to cause harm.”
A law-enforcement officer speeding upon entering a highway in Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, entered the shoulder of the road at 55 mph. He didn’t see the couple walking on the shoulder. His car struck the woman and killed her and her unborn child.
“[M]ere knowledge that driving at high speed at night could have fatal consequences is not enough to allege a constitutional violation,” the court concluded.
In contrast, an officer volunteered backup for a traffic stop where officers on the scene didn’t need help in Flores v. City of South Bend, 997 F.3d 725. The officer drove 98 mph in a 30-mph zone with “infrequent use of his lights or sirens.”
He drove blind through a controlled intersection at full speed, crashing into a car and killing the driver. This, the court held, showed deliberate indifference, “stating a plausible due-process claim under the ‘shocks the conscience’ standard.”
‘Less Egregious’ Conduct
“Officer Streicher’s conduct was less egregious than the conduct alleged in Lisby and Hill, which involved dangerous, high-speed driving by police officers,” the court summarized.
“And yet in those cases, we held that the allegations fell short of the high bar for an actionable due-process claim.”
The facts “construed in the estate’s favor, do not support a reasonable inference that Streicher knew of impending harm and consciously refused to prevent it. That is, there is no evidence that he acted with deliberate indifference to imminent harm.”
Even if a jury could infer the necessary level of intent, the court explained, “it was not clearly established at the time of the accident that a police officer’s distracted driving amounts to a due-process violation.”