July 7, 2026 – A 2023 civil commitment order had sufficient evidence to support it beyond the alleged hearsay, and collateral consequences made the issue suitable for resolution, a 5-2 majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided in Waukesha County v. R.D.T., 2026 WI 24.
“We hold that Ryden’s appeal is not moot,” wrote Justice Rebecca Frank Dallet for the majority. “We further conclude that the order should not be vacated because, even if the circuit court erred, that error did not affect Ryden’s substantial rights.”
Justice Dallet’s concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Jill J. Karofsky and Justice Janet C. Protasiewicz, responded to Waukesha County’s argument that this hearsay was OK.
“[I]f hearsay is too unreliable to be admitted in a garden variety breach-of-contract case, then the same should be true in an involuntary commitment case where ‘significant liberty interests [are] at stake.’”
According to Justice Annette Kingsland Ziegler and Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley, the court shouldn’t reach the merits.
Jay D. Jerde, Mitchell Hamline 2006, is a legal writer for the State Bar of Wisconsin, Madison. He can be reached by email or by phone at (608) 250-6126.
“Appeals from recommitment orders require the ward to demonstrate that a favorable decision would have some impact on him. This appeal is missing any such demonstration,” Justice Ziegler wrote.
Prior Recommitment Hearing Hearsay
Jefferson County Circuit Court first involuntarily committed Ryden (a pseudonym) in October 2021 and subsequently recommitted him in 2022 and 2023.
Ryden moved to Waukesha County shortly after the 2023 recommitment. The county petitioned to recommit him for another year.
Two professionals testified at the Waukesha County Circuit Court hearing based on treatment records and conversations with treatment providers in Jefferson County.
Ryden didn’t object to the testimony but raised a hearsay objection only to the written reports the professionals submitted to the court. The circuit court overruled the objections and admitted the reports.
While Ryden’s appeal of the hearsay ruling was pending, in 2024 he was recommitted a fourth time. The court of appeals held the appeal moot.
Not Moot but Harmless Error
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, held that “an appeal of an expired recommitment order is not moot because vacating the order would still have practical effects on two of the order’s collateral consequences.”
Those two consequences include potential “liability for the cost of care” and the “constitutional right to possess a firearm.”
Vacating a prior recommitment order would create automatic liability under Wis. Stat. section 46.10(2), the majority explained. Collection actions may follow.
Although Ryden didn’t establish a threat of collections, the burden to show mootness rests with Waukesha County, the majority said, and nothing in the record indicates satisfaction.
While involuntarily committed, Ryden cannot possess a firearm under Wis. Stat. section 51.20(13)(cv)1., but with the right record and reputation, a circuit court may restore the right, the majority said.
Under S.A.M., a recommitment order would “practically alter a committed person’s ‘record and reputation’ for dangerousness” – a strong influence on a circuit court’s decision.
This holds true, contrary to Waukesha County’s argument, even if the individual is subsequently recommitted, the majority held.
With a live controversy before it, the majority determined “[w]e need not decide whether admission of these reports was in fact erroneous” because “the error is harmless” – “it does not affect the substantial rights of either party.”
The testimony the two professionals gave in court – which Ryden did not object to – “strongly supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Ryden was dangerous,” the majority held.
“[T]he admission of the objected-to reports did not affect his substantial rights.”
Justice Dallet Concurrence: No Hearsay Exception
“Hearsay is inherently unreliable,” Justice Dallet explained in her concurrence, because it’s made outside of court, insulated against the ability to cross-examine the declarant.
Waukesha County argued that Wis. Stat. section 51.20(1)(am) allows hearsay at a recommitment hearing “so long as it is contained in the subject individual’s treatment records.”
What the statute actually addresses, Justice Dallet said, is the challenge of proving dangerousness to justify recommitment while the individual is already under care.
This “alternative evidentiary path,” Justice Dallet said, allows use of the individual’s treatment record to show that the individual would be dangerous “if treatment were withdrawn.”
The statute lacks express language to support an interpretation that makes hearsay admissible, Dallet described.
There is no explicit exception. The statute doesn’t contain standard limiting language allowing only reliable hearsay. “[N]o relevant legislative history has been found.”
Even if the records cannot be admitted because of hearsay, testimony “based on” the treatment record remains admissible, Dallet said.
Justice Ziegler Dissent: No Liability, No Appeal
“Collateral consequences require a causal connection between the consequence and the challenged order to overcome the expired commitment’s mootness,” Justice Ziegler explained.
S.A.M. “radically weakened this reasoning,” she said.
“S.A.M. is unsound in principle, demonstrating a profound misunderstanding of mootness … [holding] that the case was not moot based on purely theoretical consequences.”
“Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, Ryden’s three other commitments impose the exact same consequences,” Justice Ziegler wrote, and the subsequent recommitment shows that his struggles continue.
“‘Liability for the cost of’ caring for Ryden can be a collateral consequence, … [b]ut there is no guarantee that it is one,” Ziegler said.
“Potential financial labilities” are “too speculative” for them to be collateral consequences.
“While the County ‘may bring an action to enforce the liability,’ … it is not obligated to do so, and here, it has said that it is not,” Justice Ziegler said.
Before any collection, she explained, the County would need to determine what those costs are, Ryden’s ability to pay, and “overcome any of Ryden’s defenses to payment.”
“Those liabilities turn into an enforceable debt if the County exercises that discretion,” Justice Ziegler concluded. “There is simply nothing on this record to indicate that Ryden would be financially liable for the cost of care associated with this case.”
This article was originally published on the State Bar of Wisconsin’s Wisbar Court Review blog, which covers case decisions and other developments in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. To contribute to this blog, contact Joe Forward.