WJI Intern
The Wisconsin Supreme Court issued three decisions at the end of June addressing different aspects of Wisconsin’s laws concerning mental health involuntary commitment and treatment. The cases—State v. N.K.B., Outagamie County v. M.J.B., and Waukesha County v. R.D.T.—involved involuntary medication, statutory deadlines in civil commitment proceedings, and appeals from expired recommitment orders.
Although the cases arose in different contexts, each turned on the same question: how the statutory framework applies when procedures governing competency proceedings or involuntary commitments are challenged.
In State v. N.K.B., the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether a circuit court could order involuntary commitment and medication under one set of statutes after a defendant had been committed under another. Wisconsin law establishes separate procedures for restoring a defendant’s competency in a criminal case and for civilly committing someone because they are mentally ill and dangerous. The dispute centered on whether those procedures could be used interchangeably.
N.K.B. had been found incompetent to stand trial and committed for competency restoration. After initially authorizing medication to restore competency for the criminal case, the circuit court later relied on a different statutory provision to continue ordering medication based on finding N.K.B. to be dangerous.
The Supreme Court concluded that Wisconsin law did not authorize that approach. Although both the competency statutes for criminal cases and Wisconsin’s civil commitment laws allow involuntary medication in certain circumstances, the court said the sets of statutes address different situations and establish separate procedures.
A commitment for competency restoration does not give a court authority to order medication under the dangerousness provisions that apply in civil commitment cases, the high court said. Courts must use the statutory process the Legislature established for the specific type of proceeding before ordering involuntary medication.
Outagamie County v. M.J.B. concerned the county’s violation of a statutory deadline and whether such a violation automatically invalidates an involuntary commitment.
Wisconsin law generally requires two mental health professionals to evaluate an individual and provide written reports to counsel at least 48 hours before the final civil commitment hearing.
In M.J.B.’s case, an examiner completed the required report on time but defense counsel did not receive access to the report before the 48-hour deadline because of the Labor Day weekend. M.J.B. argued that the missed deadline deprived the circuit court of competency to proceed and required the commitment order to be vacated.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the statutory deadline must be followed but rejected the argument that every violation requires reversal. Instead, it found that a commitment order should be vacated only if the delay affected the individual’s substantial rights.
In M.J.B.’s case, the county did not rely on the late report, the examiner who prepared it did not testify, and the delayed disclosure did not prejudice M.J.B’s ability to challenge the commitment. As a result, the error was harmless, the court said, affirming the commitment order.
In Waukesha County v. R.D.T., the Supreme Court addressed whether a person may continue appealing an involuntary recommitment order after it has expired and, if so, whether alleged evidentiary errors in R.D.T.’s case required the order to be vacated.
“Recommitment” means a court-ordered extension of an earlier commitment period.
The county argued that R.D.T.’s appeal had to be dismissed because the recommitment order had expired.
The justices disagreed, explaining that an expired recommitment order may continue to carry significant legal consequences, such as potential liability for the cost of care received during the recommitment and the effect on a future petition to restore firearm rights. Because vacating the order could affect those continuing consequences, the appeal was not moot.
R.D.T. also argued that the circuit court improperly admitted hearsay evidence when ordering recommitment. The Supreme Court determined that any error, if it occurred, was harmless. Other, unobjected-to testimony independently supported the finding that R.D.T. met the standard for recommitment. Thus, the court affirmed the recommitment order.