Hochhausen was convicted of speeding under §346.57(5). The circuit court imposed a 15-day suspension of Hochhausen’s operating privileges and a civil forfeiture pursuant to §343.30(1n). On appeal he argued that §343.30(1n) does not apply to convictions under §346.57(5), The court of appeals agreed and reversed.
Section 343.30(1n) provides in relevant part: “A court shall suspend the operating privilege of a person for a period of 15 days upon the person’s conviction by the court of exceeding the applicable speed limit as established by s. 346.57(4)(gm) or (h), by 25 or more miles per hour.”
In a nutshell, the court of appeals held that under the plain language of §343.30(1n) , Hochhausen’s conviction for violating §346.57(5) his conviction for violating § 346.57(5) is not a “conviction by the court of exceeding the applicable speed limit as established by [§] 346.57(4)(gm) or (h).” Opinion, ¶9.
To get around the plain language of the statute, the circuit court and the County offered some creative arguments for why the mandatory suspension should apply to Hochhausen’s conviction, but the court of appeals rejected them. Opinion, ¶¶10-16.